



Overtime, and with the advent of moving to asset-light, the companies in the corporate hotel 
industry have given up parts of the value-chain. This has enabled new intermediate markets 
to emerge which have divided a previously integrated production/service process and 
enabled sets of specialised firms to enter and for the industry to become vertically 
disintegrated. This paper examines the drivers, as well as the necessary conditions and 
enabling processes, which have facilitated this industrial change. For the major hotel 
companies, competing in a disintegrated industry has far-reaching consequences which have 
a spill-over effect on tourism education and research. 
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The Economist very aptly describes the current business model of the corporate hotel 
industry: 
‘YOU book a room on the website of a famous international hotel chain. As you arrive 
to check in, its reassuring brand name is above the door. Its logo is everywhere: on 
the staff uniforms, the stationery, the carpets. But the hotel is owned by someone 
else—often an individual or an investment fund—who has taken out a franchise on 
the brand. The owner may also be delegating the running of the hotel, either to the 
company that owns the brand or to another management firm altogether. The bricks-
and-mortar may be leased from a property firm. In some cases, yet another company 
may be supplying most of the staff, and an outside caterer may run the restaurants. 
Welcome to the virtual hotel.’ (The Economist, 2009)  
It has not always been this way. Previously, as well as designing and owning brands, hotel 
companies undertook the marketing, sales and distribution of hotels; owned or leased hotel 
buildings; managed hotels; oversaw day-to-day operations; employed all hotel staff; and 
owned or maintained strong links with suppliers. They were involved in all of the structured 
activities which taken together lead to the construction of a hotel experience for the 
consumer; in this they resembled large vertically integrated, horizontally diversified, 
managerially-directed ‘Chandlerian’ corporations (Lamoreaux, Raff & Temin, 2004; Langois, 
2003).  
This paper is focused on the largest hotel companies – the corporate hotel industry - the top 
ten of which; all operate internationally, together account for some 89 brands and are listed 
on stock exchanges globally. 
 - Take in Table 1 about here – 
Overtime, and with the advent of moving to asset-light, companies have given up parts of the 
value-chain, as described above. This has enabled new intermediate markets to emerge 
which have divided a previously integrated production/service process and enabled sets of 
specialised firms to enter the industry (Jacobides, 2005). It is argued that the industry has 
become vertically disintegrated. Disintegration can be observed in a significant number of 
industries, as producers recognize that they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge 
technology and practices in every field required for the success of their products and 
services (Gilson, Sabel & Scott, 2009); for hotel companies, competing in a disintegrated 
industry has far-reaching consequences which then have a spill-over effect on tourism 
education and research. This paper examines the drivers, as well as the necessary 
conditions and processes, which have facilitated this industrial change. These are 
summarised in Figure 1. 




2. Motivating factors driving disintegration 
It is said that doing everything in the value chain reduces the effectiveness of production. 
Surrendering parts of the value chain to other firms, enables specialisation gains (Jacobides, 
2005). For major hotel companies, competing now as experts in hotel branding, systems and 
franchising (and sometimes managing) rather than in hotel-keeping has meant less exposure 
to high risks, better returns and faster growth for major hotel companies. The stock market 
has favoured this narrower business model and shareholders have received large dividend 
pay-outs from property asset sales (Slattery, Gamse & Roper, 2008).  
Technology companies are said to precipitate a change in vertical structure insomuch as 
they change information or modularize a production process (Jacobides, 2005). Online travel 
agents (OTA’s) recognised the potential gains from a reorganisation of production – when 
hotel companies themselves modularised and computerised the distribution process. Hotel 
companies correspondingly supported latent gains in trade by embracing the business model 
of OTAs, especially when the hotel cycle was in a trough period. Specialised production is 
also incentive-intensive and the OTAs and metasearch platforms, as outside agents, have 
managed to be closer to the consumer market (and other linked services) and have been 
more effective.  
Pure gains from trade can also play a significant role in disintegration. Franchised brands 
such as Holiday Inns are testament of how firm capability differentials push disintegration. 
Franchising is very attractive as a global growth method because it does not create future 
foreign competitors over time that come back to compete in domestic economies. The 
franchising of global hotel brands can therefore be seen as a way of curtailing national 
competitors in international markets, a by-product of gains from trade. 
Other new entrants who have benefited from the disintegrated industry structure include real 
estate and institutional investors who have sought to spread risk over a number of markets 
and property-types to reap benefits of demand smoothing. With the purchase of hotel 
properties, real estate investment trusts (REITs), in particular, have developed knowledge of 
this new property investment class and implemented very sophisticated performance 
monitoring and financial modelling techniques to maximise their investments in what they see 
as a pure property-play business. They have gained financially from disintegration in a way 
never possible by integrated hotel companies.   
3. Enabling processes 
The gains from intra-firm specialisation, talked about above, have also set off a process of 
intra-organizational partitioning, which simplifies coordination along parts of the value chain 
and drives disintegration (Jacobides, 2005). Overtime, and with the advent of moving to 
asset-light, hotel companies have partitioned their organization structures, as such having 
different divisions for diverse entry modes. In the hotel companies investigated by Brookes 
and Roper (2012), organisational designs featured the administrative separation of (1) 
owned, leased and managed, (2) franchised, and (3) master-franchised hotels. In the last two 
divisions, transactions were with outside agents rather than with other internal divisions. 
Their market procurement activities largely explained why there were cultural and perceptual 
distinctions between divisions. The fact that the performance of the different divisions could 
be assessed has also led to financially-driven decisions being made to exit parts of the value 
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chain; to get out of owning and leasing and acknowledge the cash flow benefits of the 
franchise model.  
A second enabling process for disintegration - vertical co-specialisation - emerges as firms 
come up with mutually complementary roles in market transactions (Jacobides, 2005: 484).  
Organizing transactions across the boundaries of firms takes time however; it is a gradual 
learning process. It is possibly for this reason that the industry is at its most disintegrated 
currently even though the separation of the ownership, management and operation of hotels 
from brand management have been in evidence since the early 1940s. Further, the 
economic, legal and political contexts have also influenced knowledge about innovative ways 
to transact. For example, the economic recession pushed transactions to occur and then 
mature between hotel companies and OTA’s. The regulatory set-up of REITs and the 
outward investment strategies of trophy wealth funds and property companies led to sale- 
and manage/franchise-back market exchanges. Even the fact that customers are thought to 
patronise a franchise due to its brand reputation in the marketplace and the implicit promises 
of a standardised product or service offering, regardless of who the operator of a specific 
franchised outlet might be (Dant, 2008), can be said to have further driven the growth of 
franchise systems and the need to transact across the boundaries of existing hotel firms.  In 
addition, supplementary stakeholders have emerged with important roles in making these 
transactions across the boundaries of firms possible. Specialist lawyers, accountants and 
consultants have become established offering services which create and augment business 
relationships between the many agents involved in the hotel value chain.      
4. Necessary conditions 
Given standardised information and simplified coordination, it is suggested that new 
intermediate markets emerge which break up the chain, allowing new types of vertically 
specialised firms to participate in an industry (Jacobides, 2005).  
Governments have long taken ownership positions in internationally-branded hotels, 
beginning when InterContinental and Hilton Hotels choose to expand outside their home 
market. For the latter, managing enabled the reduction of risk and opened up opportunities to 
develop in countries where ownership was restricted. More importantly, the establishment of 
management contracts prompted the emergence of a more formulaic method for operating 
hotels. This was important to establish: far-off hotel managers needed controlling and hotel 
owners required tangible evidence of managerial competence.  The very first operating 
agreements were therefore underpinned by procedure manuals and training programmes, 
covering all aspects of hotel operations. However, it was the advent of franchising which 
really enabled a more industrialised model of hotel keeping to emerge which served to 
further fragment the value chain.  
Franchising requires the highest level of standardisation and replication and the issue of 
control is paramount as it is external parties who are managing and operating hotels on 
behalf of hotel companies. Control is gained by the latter through legal contractual 
stipulations (usually fee structures, termination clauses and restrictions, territory rights and 
adherence to operating manuals) and administrative control which is usually exercised via 
operational processes used to achieve goal congruence between the two parties and the 
processes used to monitor adherence to them (Brookes and Roper, 2012). These controls 
are administered through the system’s format facilitators: the wide range of policies and 
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procedures that form the foundation for the format’s effective and efficient functioning.  At the 
individual level they include specification of equipment and detailed operating instructions. 
Thus, the whole operation and management of hotels has become codified -– simplified, 
transmissible and more universally understood allowing for the modularisation or 
commoditisation of the value chain. 
Coordination between firms in this disintegrated industry and the standardisation of 
information has also been facilitated by a wealth of specialist legal, financial and consulting 
firms who have been able to assist new entry firms to do business successfully. They have 
developed, for example, standard contractual agreements and templates and made available 
(often free of charge) sources of comparable hotel performance data. 
5. Conclusions 
The original products, services and core technologies of the hotel industry have remained 
much the same and the sequence of activities needing to be done has also not changed 
radically. However, there have been profound implications of disintegration amongst the 
major hotel companies: the number and nature of firms that participate in the industry has 
increased; entry to the industry has fallen in certain parts of the value chain; and the nature 
of competition has altered.  
Competing in a disintegrated industry has far-reaching consequences, with a spill-over effect 
on tourism education and research: 
 For the major hotel companies, scale is needed as specialist brand and franchise 
systems. However, the hotel industry globally still remains largely fragmented in the 
hands of independents. The model of relying on these independents and outside 
investors to increase market share is therefore challenging; CEOs in Starwood, 
ACCOR and Four Seasons have all lost their jobs as a result of lagging growth. There 
have been calls from activist investors for mergers between the largest companies in 
order to accomplish more scale and better growth prospects. There is therefore an 
enhanced level of vulnerability in firms competing in this disintegrated value chain.    
 There is no doubt that disintegration will continue with new markets opening in the 
very heart of the value chain – in hotel supply. Alternative accommodation types and 
those experiences offered by the sharing economy could further separate the hotel 
value chain.    
 In terms of tourism management education, we need to develop a new generation of 
corporate managers who can develop and maintain relationships, globally network 
and manage in a federal way. We need graduates with competencies in ‘the business 
of hotels’ rather than operations. In research, we need to engage much more with this 
new competitive landscape, exploring further the firms in new intermediate markets 
and building theory based on practice (Roper & Hodari, 2015).   
One cannot end without mentioning a worrying trend. Returning to The Economist piece at 
the start of this paper, hotels are ultimately selling a hospitality experience, however, one is 
sometimes left searching, without success, for the mention of the ‘guest’ in the reports of the 
incumbents in this emerging disintegrated industry. The ‘virtual hotel’ of the future might be 
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Table 1: 10 largest hotel companies by number of rooms, 2014 
 
Ranking Hotel Company Origin Hotels  Rooms Brands 
(2015)i 
2014 2013 2014 2013 
1 InterContinental 
Hotels Group  
UK 4,840 4,602 710,295 675,982 9 
2 Hilton Worldwide USA 4,278 3,992 708,268 659,917 11 
3 Marriott  USA 4,044 3,672 692,801 638,793  
4 Wyndham Hotel 
Group 
USA 7,645 7,342 660,826 627,437 15 
5 Choice Hotels 
Intl 
USA 6,379 6,199 505,278 497,023 11 
6 ACCOR FRA 3,717 3,515 482,296 450,199 16 
7 Starwood Hotels 
& Resorts 
USA 1,222 1,121 354,225 328,055 10 
8 Best Western USA 3,931 4,013 303,522 307,305 6 
9 Home Inn CHN 2,609 1,772 296,075 214,070 3 
10 Carlson Rezidor 
Hotel Group 
CAN 1,092 1,077 172,234 166,245 8 
 
Source: Companies reported data from 2014, accessed from The 2015 Big Brands Report, 




                                                          
i Companies reported data from 2015 
